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Enforcing a Congressional Mandate:
LEAA and Civil Rights
Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits recipients of
federal financial assistance from engaging in racial discrimination:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color,
or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.1
The Act then prescribes measures to be taken by funding agencies
of the federal government against recipients who disregard this pro-
hibition.
2
The principle set forth in this statute was not new. It had been
given effect in many areas through individual Executive Orders, 3 and
it had often been the substance of proposed amendments to appro-
priations bills. 4 Some agencies had acted on their own initiative to
eliminate discrimination in their programs., By 1964, however, this
ad hoc approach had proven unsatisfactory, and Congress endeavored
"to settle the issue of discrimination once and for all, in a uniform,
across-the-board manner."" Since the passage of the Act, Congress has
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970). Title VI of that Act, id. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4, governs
400 federal programs and activities, involving 25 different agencies and 1,50 billion
annually. VI UNITED STATES COI ISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDRA L CIVIL RIGHTS
ENFORCEMIENT EFFoRT-1974, at 1-2 (1975) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as VI
CoMMIssION REPORT-1974].
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 to 2000d-4 (1970). The term "agency" as used in this Note
includes executive departments and subdivisions thereof.
3. E.g., Exec. Order No. 11063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1959-1963 Comp.) (federally supported
housing programs); Exec. Order No. 10925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963 Comp.) (government
employment and employment by government contractors); Exec. Order No. 9981, 3
C.F.R. 722 (1943-1948 Comp.) (armed services).
4. E.g., 106 CONG. REC. 11294 (1960) (School Construction Assistance Act); 104 CONG.
REC. 16723 (1958) (National Defense Education Act); 101 CONG. REc. 12136 (1955) (Housing
Act of 1956).
5. E.g., 45 C.F.R. § 160.3(b) (1962) (HEW training programs); 28 Fed. Reg. 7221
(1963) (Dep't of Labor training programs); 27 Fed. Reg. 12611 (Dep't of Agric. mort-
gages), 11669 (1962) (Veterans Administration housing).
6. 110 CONG. RFc. 6544 (1964) (Sen. Humphrey). Accord, id. 7054-58 (1964) (Sen.
Pastore); 109 CONG. REc. 14493 (1963) (Sen. Keating). There were several reasons for this
new approach. First, it was hoped that a single legislative command would end the
time-consuming practice of considering a specific nondiscrimination amendment with
every proposed spending bill, a practice which forced the controversial issue of racial
discrimination into every discussion of proposed legislation. 110 CONG. REc. 2468 (Rep.
Celler), 6544 (1964) (Sen. Humphrey). Second, several agencies had been reluctant to
enforce nondiscrimination by recipients of their funds on the ground that their authority
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extended the principle of nondiscrimination in federally funded pro-
grams by prohibiting types of discrimination not covered by Title V1.
Twelve years later, the congressional mandate remains unexecuted;
discriminatory practices still abound among programs and activities
receiving federal funds.8 Congress recently has taken notice of the
failure of one funding agency, the Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-
ministration (LEAA), to prevent its recipients from discriminating,
and is now weighing proposals to tighten the agency's enforcement
procedures. 9 This Note will analyze the record of LEAA in civil
to do so was uncertain. 109 CONG. REc. 14492 (1963) (Sen. Javits); 110 CONG. REc. 7056
(1964) (Sens. Pastore and Ribicoff). Third, a number of existing federal statutes, enacted
before the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
appeared to contemplate grants to segregated institutions. E.g., Hill-Burton Act of 1946,
ch. 958, § 622(f), 60 Stat. 1040 (hospital construction); Second Morrill Act of 1890, 7
U.S.C. § 323 (1970) (annual awards to land grant colleges). The proponents of the
Civil Rights Act hoped "to wipe them off the books" without waiting for courts to
declare them unconstitutional. 110 CONG. Rrc. 6544 (1964) (Sen. Humphrey).
7. Title VI does not bar sex discrimination and limits its prohibition against em-
ployment discrimination to programs in which "a primary objective of the Federal
financial assistance is to provide employment." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4 (1970). Subsequent
statutes which contain these prohibitions missing in Title VI include, e.g., 31 U.S.C.
§ 1242(a) (Supp. IV 1974) (Revenue Sharing); 42 U.S.C. § 3766(c) (Supp. IV 1974) (Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration).
8. VI CoMMIssSIoN REPoRT-1974 (analyzing the Title VI shortcomings of seven agen-
cies); I-V id. (documenting continued discrimination in other programs in which the
Government is involved). The situation in earlier years has been documented exhaustively
by the United States Commission on Civil Rights [hereinafter referred to as the Civil
Rights Commission]. E.g., UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL
CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT (1970) [hereinafter cited as CoMMISSION REPORT-
1970]; UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCE-
MENT EFFORT: ONE YEAR LATER (1971) [hereinafter cited as CommissIxON REPORT-1971];
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT: A REASSESSMENT (1973) [hereinafter cited as CommISSION REPORT-1973]. For a
discussion of the success of early efforts by HEW to enforce Title VI, see note 19 infra.
On the failure of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration to enforce nondis-
crimination in the program it funds, see pp. 727-28, 730-31 infra.
9. LEAA's operations are described in note 28 infra. The agency's present funding
period expires on June 30, 1976. The President's proposed bill to extend the LEAA
funding program through September, 1981 was introduced in both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. It does not propose any change in the agency's present civil
rights enforcement procedures. See S. 2212, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 9236, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (leaving unchanged § 501 of the Crime Control Act of 1973, 42
U.S.C. § 3766 (Supp. IV 1974)). The Senate Judiciary Committee reported out S. 2212
without any civil rights amendments. S. REP. No. 94-847, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
The House Judiciary Committee, however, reported out an entirely new bill, H.R. 13636,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), which greatly strengthens the agency's civil rights program.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1155, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 25-27 (1976). The new provisions are largely
those suggested earlier in H.R. 12364, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) by Representative
Jordan, who successfully sponsored a civil rights amendment to the LEAA appropria-
tions bill in 1973 (discussed in note 40 infra). In both Houses, the future of LEAA's
civil rights program and suggestions for its improvement have been discussed. E.g.,
Hearings on Amendments to Title I (LEAA) of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 368-74 (1975 & 1976) (testimony of Aryeh Neier,
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rights enforcement and offer a solution to the problem now before
Congress. It suggests that the agency's failure can be ascribed to its
having been granted excessive discretion in an area peripheral to
its chief administrative concern-the same broad discretion normally
given to agencies in the performance of their main functions. It
argues that an agency like LEAA cannot be expected, on its own
initiative, to enforce nondiscrimination vigorously, when such en-
forcement might require a partial compromising of its narrower day-
to-day purposes. Enforcement can be effective in such a situation
only when the agency is given exact rules to follow and when in
addition a forceful external control is provided.
I. Existing Enforcement Schemes
A. Title VI
Section 601 and its enforcement provisions form Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.10 These enforcement provisions leave federal
agencies broad discretion in responding to racial discrimination by
recipients of their financial assistance." The agencies are first obliged
to seek "voluntary compliance" with § 601.12 If this fails, they must
attempt to enforce compliance by cutting off funds to the offender
or by employing "any other means authorized by law."'13 Prominent
among these other means of enforcement is referral of the case to the
Attorney General, who may bring an action against the recipient.
14
This choice of enforcement methods was intended to allow funding
agencies flexibility in responding to instances of discrimination.'5 As
American Civil Liberties Union); Statement of Representative Jordan submitted to the
Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar.
11, 1976) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1970).
11. Section 602 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970), provides:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal fi-
nancial assistance to any program or activity [is] . . . directed to effectuate the
provisions of Section 2000d of this title. . . . Compliance . . .may be effected (1)
by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance ... or (2) by
any other means authorized by law...
This section requires some form of action by funding agencies to enforce nondiscrim-
ination by their recipients. 110 CONG. Rc. 6544 (Sen. Humphrey), 7058 (1964) (Sen.
Pastore). See Comment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-Implementation and
Impact, 36 Gao. WAsH. L. REv. 824, 827 (1968).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970).
13. Id.
14. H.R. RaP. No. 914, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 86 (1963). See Guidelines for the Enforce-
ment of Title VI, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 C.F.R. § 50.3, at 205 (1975). The Guide-
lines also suggest a number of administrative alternatives to fund termination. Id.
15. Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of Persons
Within the Jurisdiction of the United States Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House
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a check on this discretion, judicial review of agency action under
Title VI is available to individuals claiming to have suffered dis-
crimination at the hands of a recipient.16
The latitude allowed by these enforcement provisions has contrib-
uted greatly to the ineffectiveness of Title VI. The discretion ac-
corded the funding agencies has been used as a warrant for inaction
by bureaucracies wedded to their own programs and by administra-
tions with little enthusiasm for vigorous civil rights enforcement. 17
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4, at 1381-82 (Att'y Gen. Kenned)),
1544 (Sec'y Celebrezze, HEW), 1890 (Rep. Celler), 2758 (1963) (Rep. Libonati) [herein.
after cited as Subcommittee Hearings]; 110 CONG. Rac. 2467 (1964) (Rep. Gill).
The grant of a choice of remedies was also an attempt to accommodate competing
views. Some civil rights advocates felt that fund termination should be mandatory.
They saw in the relatively unbridled discretion of the agencies the potential for its
abuse by a program-oriented bureaucracy or a conservative administration. See, e.g.,
Subcommittee Hearings, supra, at 2093-94 (Sidney Zagri, Teamsters Union), 2352 (Rep.
Halpern). As Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary of NAACP, explained:
[W]e always shy away from "discretionary" in these areas. We feel that unless [fund
termination] is made mandatory, all sorts of discretion will be exercised and until
it is demonstrated in good faith that discretion means discretion and does not mean
discrimination, then we would want mandatory phraseology in there.
Id. at 2161. Others opposed the fund termination remedy either on the grounds that
it would jeopardize minority-oriented programs or that it would be an unwise or un-
constitutional assumption of power by the Executive. See 110 CONG. Rac. 2466 (Rep.
Elliott), 6527 (1964) (Sen. Holland); Subcommittee Hearings, supra at 1583 (1963) (Rep.
Dorn); H.R. Rai,. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 64, 86 (1963).
16. Title VI explicitly grants review to any person aggrieved by an agency decision
to terminate funds, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1970), and review of agency action other than
termination of funds if an independent statutory basis for such review exists:
Any department or agency action taken pursuant to [the enforcement provisions
of Title VI] shall be subject to such judicial review as may otherwise be provided
by law for similar action taken by such department or agency on other grounds.
Id. For this independent basis of review, victims of discrimination generally rely on the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which establishes a right of judicial review, subject
to certain exceptions, for any "person suffering legal wrong because of agency action,
or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). ("Agency action" includes any "failure to act by the
agency." Id. § 551(13). Review is not available if the action is "committed to agency
discretion by law" or if another statute "precludes review." Id. § 701(a).) Cases in-
volving APA review of agency action under Title VI include Adams v. Richardson,
480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. City of Chicago, 395 F. Supp. 329, 342
n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Hardy v. Leonard, 377. F. Supp. 831, 835 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
17. The antipathy with which the federal bureaucracy has viewed Title VI has been
documented by the Civil Rights Commission:
The enforcement failure was the result, to a large extent, of placing the respon-
sibility for ensuring racial and ethnic justice upon a massive Federal bureaucracy
which for years had been an integral part of a discriminatory system. Not only
did the bureaucrats resist civil rights goals; they often viewed any meaningful effort
to pursue them to be against their particular program's self-interest.
CoMMIssION REPoRT-1973, supra note 8, at 3. See ComssissioN REroRT-1970, supra note
8, at 1091; Tomlinson & Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal Standards in Grant-in-
Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. REy. 600, 619 (1972).
Of course this inaction could have been countered by presidential initiative. But "this
leadership unfortunately was lacking." COMMissiON REPoRT-1973, supra at 2. See 115
CONG. REc. 39490-507 (1969) (documenting suppression of civil rights enforcement efforts
in the Justice Department); Rogovin, The Genesis of the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration: A Personal Account, 5 COLUM. HUMAN RIGnTs L. Rav. 9, 20-22 (1973).
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Although fund termination was envisioned as the primary means of
enforcement under Title VI,' 8 and although it has proven the surest
deterrent to discrimination,' 9 it has been given a low priority in the
Justice Department guidelines for enforcing Title VI and is now
hardly ever' used.20 Agencies can fulfill their Title VI obligations
simply by referring instances of noncompliance to the Attorney Gen-
eral, whose decisions whether or not to sue are generally not re-
viewable by the courts.2 '
The broad grant of discretion has also undermined the right of
judicial review given by Title VI to victims of discrimination. Since
the plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking
review, he generally must wait until the agency has made a final
decision not to terminate funds.22 However, the discretion conferred
by Title VI permits agencies to prolong efforts to obtain compliance
almost indefinitely, thus forestalling judicial relief.2 - And even if re-
18. See, e.g, Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 15, at 1544 (Sec'y Celebrezze, HEW),
1786-88 (George Meany, AFL-CIO), 1890-91 (Joseph Rauh, ADA), 2161 (Roy Wilkins,
NAACP). The wording of Title VI indicates a preference for the fund cutoff remedy.
Not only is fund termination mentioned first, but it is the only sanction specifically
named. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I (1970). The preference for fund termination under Title
VI is noted in, e.g., United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 852-53
(5th Cir. 1966) ("Congress was dissatisfied with the slow progress inherent in the judicial
adversary process. . . . [and] therefore fashioned a new method of enforcement.");
REPORT OF THE WHITE HousE CONFERENCE, To FULFILL THESE RIGirIS 63 (Gov't Printing
Off. 1966) ("administrative proceedings prescribed by Congress as the primary device
of enforcing Title VI"); VI COMMlSSION REPoRT-1974, at 22-24, 386, 653; Comment,
supra note 11, at 833; Notre Dame Conference on Federal Civil Rights Legislation and
Administration: A Report, 41 NoTE DAME LAWv. 906, 922-24 (1966).
19. Early use of the sanction by HEW is instructive. Between July, 1964 and March,
1970, HEW initiated approximately 600 administrative proceedings against school dis-
tricts found not to be in compliance with § 601 standards. In 400 of these cases, the
agency found that the districts came into compliance following threat of termination,
with no need for actual termination. Among the 200 cases in which funds were actually
cut off, HEW subsequently determined that compliance had been achieved, and federal
assistance was resumed in all but four districts. VI Comss soN REPoRT-1974, at 384-85.
See Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1163 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Tomlinson &
Mashaw, supra note 17, at 631; Comment, supra note 11, at 871.
20. The Department of Justice Guidelines for the Enforcement of Title VI, Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 28 C.F.R. § 50.3 (1975), issued in 1965, suggested alternative judicial
and administrative means of enforcement and authorized fund termination only where
these alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate. The Civil Rights Commission
found that every agency it examined in 1974 had failed to cut off funds in cases where
termination would have been the appropriate means of enforcement. VI COMMISSION
REPoRT-1974, at 653, 762-97. See Adams v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 269, 271 (D.D.C. 1975).
21. See K. DAvIs, DISCRETIONARY JuSTICE 209 (1969); Note, Reviewability of Prosecu-
torial Discretion: Failure to Prosecute, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 130 (1975).
22. See, e.g., Taylor v. Cohen, 405 F.2d 277, 280 (4th Cir. 1968); Green Street Ass'n
v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1, 8-9 (7th Cir. 1967); Green v. Cauthen, 379 F. Supp. 361, 378 (D.S.C.
1974).
23. See Hearings on Civil Rights Aspects of Revenue Sharing Before the Subcomm.
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 151 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Revenue Sharing Hearings]; VI COMMISSION
REPoRT-1974, at 365-67, 369-76.
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view is available, the plaintiff will generally prevail only if the agency
action or inaction in enforcing Title VI is "arbitrary, capricious, [or]
an abuse of discretion." 24 Finally, even when courts order that some
action be taken, the nature of that action may be left to agency
discretion.2
5
Congressional supervision of Title VI enforcement efforts is limited
and cannot compensate for the defects of the statute's enforcement
provisions. Oversight is by committees with only peripheral interests
in civil rights. 26 Congress can refuse to renew appropriations for an
24. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). See Hardy v. Leonard, 377 F. Supp. 831, 840 (N.D.
Cal. 1974); Shannon v. HUD, 305 F. Supp. 205, 214 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd in relevant part,
436 F.2d 809, 818 (3d Cir. 1970). Cf. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 413-16 (1970) (Dep't of Transp. discretion under 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970)).
An agency decision on whether or not to terminate funds, made after a hearing on
the record, will be overturned only if "unsupported by substantial evidence." See 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970). However, there appear to be no cases where victims of a re-
cipient's discrimination sought review of an agency decision not to terminate funds
made after a hearing.
25. For example, in Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1163 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
the Court held that HEW's continued funding of discriminatory school districts violated
Title VI, and then went on to state: "Far from dictating the final result with regard
to any of these districts, the order merely requires initiation of a process which, ex-
cepting contemptuous conduct, will pass beyond the District Court's continuing control
and supervision."
The reluctance of the courts to order specific relief may be overcome after protracted
litigation. For example, in Robinson v. Shultz, 8 Emp. Prac. Decs. ff 9484 (D.D.C.),
reaffirming 7 Emp. Prac. Decs. ff 9270 (D.D.C. 1974), the court held that continued
payment of Revenue Sharing funds to Chicago violated Title VI, but ordered only
that the Treasury Department choose among its alternative means of enforcement. After
further litigation, the court, ordered that the funds be placed in escrow. 8 Emp. Prac.
Decs. f 9832 (D.D.C. 1974), stay denied, 9 Emp. Prac. Decs. f 9861 (D.D.C.), confirmed
after transfer sub nom. United States v. City of Chicago, 385 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. I11.
1975). Cf. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir.), on remand, 332 F. Supp. 366
(N.D. Il1. 1971), rev'd, 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972), on remand, 363 F. Supp. 690
(N.D. Ill. 1973), rev'd, 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976).
In Gautreaux, the court of appeals concluded in 1971, after five years of litigation,
that HUD's continued funding of a racially discriminatory public housing system vio-
lated Title VI. However, in remanding to the district court, the court noted, "It may
well be that the District Judge, in his wise discretion, will conclude that little equitable
relief above the entry of a declaratory judgment and a simple 'best efforts' clause will
be necessary to remedy the wrongs which have been found to have been committed."
448 F.2d at 740-41. After much further litigation the Supreme Court recently remanded
the case to the district court to formulate a plan requiring HUD to locate public housing
in Chicago suburbs. 96 S. Ct. at 1550.
26. Every federal agency is overseen in each House by an Appropriations subcom-
mittee, a Government Operations subcommittee, and one additional subcommittee. W.
GELLHORN & C. BYsE, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 114 (6th ed. 1974).
These subcommittees are concerned with how the agency performs its primary functions.
Even the congressional committee most concerned with civil rights-the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights-cannot adequately monitor the
extent to which federal funding agencies are complying with Title VI. Letter from
Representative Edwards, Chairman, Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, to author (May 19, 1976) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
726
Enforcing a Congressional Mandate
agency which fails to fulfill the mandate of § 601, but this response
would eliminate otherwise worthwhile programs.27
Congress has never modified the Title VI enforcement scheme.
However, in 1973, it enacted an explicit civil rights provision, gov-
erning only one funding agency, which departed significantly from
the Title VI procedures. The agency governed by this new provision
was LEAA, created in 1968 as a subagency of the Department of
Justice to provide financial and technical assistance to state and local
police departments, courts, correctional institutions, and other law
enforcement organizations.
28
Although Title VI governs LEAA's funding practices, it was ap-
parent when the agency's initial appropriations period expired in
1973 that its performance in the area of civil rights had been inade-
quate.20 Regulations promulgated by LEAA had been widely criti-
cized as ineffective.30 The agency's civil rights staff assignments were
utterly insufficient.31 LEAA had failed to recognize the full reach
of Title VI, maintaining that its mandate did not even apply to
27. See, e.g., J. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 36-37 (1964).
28. LEAA was created by Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (Title I codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3795
(Supp. IV 1974)), "to assist state and local governments in strengthening and improving
law enforcement at every level by national assistance." Id. § 3701.
In fiscal year 1973 there were 12,374 recipients of LEAA funds, including 2248 law
enforcement agencies, 750 court systems, and 429 correctional facilities. VI COMMISSION
REnoRT-1974, at 272 n.721. LEAA appropriations increased from $60 million in fiscal
year 1969 to $699 million in 1972. Hearings on the Block Grant Programs of the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Gov't Operations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 4 (1971). In fiscal year 1974, LEAA
appropriations reached $871 million; total congressional authorizations for fiscal years
1974 through 1976 amounted to $3.25 billion. 1973 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 359. Bills pending
in both Houses now recommend an appropriation of almost $7 billion for the period
ending in September, 1981. S. 2212, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975); H.R. 13636, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976).
LEAA employs two methods for fund dispersal. Most funds are channelled to law
enforcement agencies through "State Planning Agencies," which develop comprehensive
annual statewide law enforcement plans, and which receive and distribute "block grants"
in accordance with the approved plan. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3722-23, 3733, 3736 (Supp. IV 1974).
In addition to such block grants, LEAA also provides "discretionary grants" directly
to state and local governments for programs of national priority not included in the
state plans. Id. §§ 3736(a)(2), 3737. In fiscal year 1973 LEAA awarded, exclusive of
grants to develop the statewide plans, $480.2 million in block grants and $86.9 million
in discretionary grants. VI COMMISSION REPoRT-1974, at 272 nn.720 & 722.
29. Hearings on the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Before Subcomm.
No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 345 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as LEAA Hearings]; LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, LAW
AND DISORDER III, at 32-36 (1973); 119 CONG. REc. 20070-71 (1973) (Rep. Jordan).
30. LAwYERS COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, supra note 29, at 35, 38 n.104.
31. Until 1971, LEAA had no civil rights office responsible for implementing its
Title VI regulations, and the office, once established, was understaffed. COMMISSION
RE'oRT-1973, supra note 8, at 97; see COMMISSION REFPORT-1970, supra note 8, at 601, 634.
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certain funding activities. 32 Even where the agency had recognized
its Title VI obligations, it had not fulfilled them. Although LEAA
had received numerous complaints concerning discrimination by its
recipients, it had never applied any sanctions and had never held
a compliance hearing.33 In fact, procedures for such a hearing had
never even been promulgated. 34 The Justice Department regulations
governing LEAA expressed a preference for enforcement through
judicial proceedings rather than fund termination.35 Yet LEA had
never referred a single case to the Attorney General, and only after
much external pressure had it intervened in a few private suits.30
B. The Crime Control Act of 1973
Congress had occasion to address the problem of LEAA's poor record
in preventing discrimination by recipients when, in 1973, it re-
viewed the agency's initial grant of funds. In the course of considering
what eventually became the Crime Control Act of 1973, 37 Congress
did not approve the President's version, which did nothing more than
state that Title VI applies to LEAA. 38 While retaining the mandate
of § 601, Congress created a set of more stringent enforcement re-
quirements addressed specifically to LEAA. Under the Crime Con-
trol Act, the agency retains control over the pace but not the mode
of enforcement. LEAA must initiate proceedings to cut off funds to
32. For example, for many years LEAA took the position that Title VI did not re-
quire it to ensure adequate minority representation in the State Planning Agencies
(described in note 28 supra). LEAA Hearings, supra note 29, at 306 (Sarah Carey,
Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law). In addition, at least through 1970
LEAA refused to recognize any obligation to compel its recipients not to discriminate
in employment, COMMISSION REPoRT-1970, supra note 8, at 572-75, even though Title
VI bars employment discrimination where employment is a "primary objective" of fi-
nancial assistance, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1970), and LEAA grants are designed in part
for "the recruiting of law enforcement and criminal justice personnel," id. § 3731(b)(2).
33. CoMMISSION REPoRT-1973, supra note 8, at 345.
34. Id. at 344 n.27.
35. 28 C.F.R. § 42.206(a) (1975) provides: "[W]here the responsible Department
official determines that judicial proceedings . . . are as likely or more likely to result
in compliance than administrative proceedings . . . , he shall invoke the judicial remedy
rather than the administrative remedy." In 1973, the Civil Rights Commission con-
cluded that "LEAA has administratively repealed the remedy of fund cut-off." Co.M-
MISSION REPoRT-1973, supra note 8, at 101 n.36.
36. 119 CONG Rc. 20071 (Rep. Jordan) (1973). In two of the suits, Morrow v.
Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895 (1975), and Castro v.
Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972), LEAA intervened 10 months after the suits were
brought and only "as a result of a great amount of external pressure to take some
action." COMMISSION REPoRT-1971, supra note 8, at 147. In the third case, interven-
tion was by court order. LAWYERS COMMITEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER Lvw. supra
note 29, at 36.
37. Pub. L. No. 93-83, 87 Stat. 197 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 40, 42 U.S.C.).
38. LEAA Hearings, supra note 29, at 26 (text of President's bill, S. 1234, 93d Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1973)).
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any recipient which fails to comply "within a reasonable time";"o the
agency can no longer rely solely on the Title VI option of "any
other means authorized by law.
' 4 0
LEAA has in fact never enacted regulations reflecting the changes
made by Congress in 1973.41 Even if the agency had responded with
regulations incorporating the statutory changes, the problem of lax
enforcement would remain, because the 1973 provisions contain three
gaps. First, they indicate no procedures that LEAA must follow in
order to find out on its own if any of its recipients is engaged in
discrimination. As a result, LEAA has never systematically reviewed
39. 42 U.S.C. § 3766(c) (Supp. IV 1974). These proceedings are conducted pursuant
to § 3757 of that title, which provides for fund termination, after a hearing, in the
event of substantial failure to comply with statutes or regulations under the Crime
Control Act. Before 1973 these termination procedures did not apply to discrimination
by recipients, because LEAA's civil rights mandate, Title VI, was not part of the Act.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I (1970).
Representative Jordan initiated the provisions reducing LEAA discretion. Her original
amendment made two major changes: it imposed a 60-day time limit on voluntary com-
pliance efforts, after which enforcement action was required, and it replaced the dis-
cretionary choice of sanctions permitted under Title VI with mandatory fund termi-
nation. After termination, the agency could use other enumerated means in its efforts
to obtain compliance. 119 CONG. REC. 20071 (1973) (Rep. Jordan). The Jordan version
passed the House, id. at 20105, but was revised in the conference committee to ac-
commodate the views of the Senate, which had approved the President's proposal. Id.
at 22082. The statute which emerged provided for mandatory termination after a
"reasonable time" rather than after 60 days, but retained the requirement that, in the
words of the conference committee, "LEAA must initiate proceedings to cut off funds
to any recipient who continues to discriminate after that period, and may, concurrently
with that initiation, take other actions." SENATE CONF. REP. No. 93-349, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 32 (1973) (emphasis added).
An earlier and more drastic amendment offered by Representative Rangel, H.R. 14239,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), would have specified even more stringent civil rights require-
ments, but was not adopted. Rangel's amendment would have required an explicit finding
of civil rights compliance before any grant was made, prohibited discrimination in the
composition of state and local planning agencies, and deleted the prohibition against
the use of quotas to promote minority employment, 42 U.S.C. § 3766(b) (1970). For the
latter provision, the Rangel amendment would have substituted a requirement of "af-
firmative action to overcome the effects of past discrimination by the grantee in em-
ployment and in the services provided." 118 CONG. REc. 11388-90 (1972).
41. Statement of Representative Jordan, supra note 9, at 1-2. Recently, LEAA has
circulated proposed regulations for comment. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 40 Fed.
Reg. 56454 (1975). If adopted, these regulations would improve LEAA's enforcement
procedures in several ways. Additional employment discrimination guidelines would
be incorporated by reference. Proposed Reg. § 42.203(b), 40 Fed. Reg. 56454 (1975).
Following the language of the Crime Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3766(c) (Supp. IV 1974),
fund termination would be mandatory once voluntary compliance efforts failed. Pro-
posed Reg. § 42.206(a), 40 Fed. Reg. 56454 (1975). Unless LEAA refers investigation to
another specified agency, any complaint would have to be investigated within 180 days.
Id. § 42.404, at 56455. Increased responsibility for aiding enforcement would be dele-
gated to the State Planning Agencies funded by LEAA. Id. § 42.406. However, the
proposed regulations fall short of fully satisfactory enforcement procedures, and legis-
lative action is therefore still required. See pp. 736-37 and notes 77-82 infra.
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the compliance of its recipients.4 2 Second, they fail to specify the pace
at which LEAA must proceed in determining the validity of a charge
of discrimination or in cutting off funds once such a determination
has been made. LEAA has exploited this omission through needless
delays in attending to complaints and through protracted compliance
negotiations.43 Third, the Act provides no guidance on the meaning
of "discrimination" as applied to activities in which LEAA recipi-
ents engage. LEAA's regulations have done little to remedy this
deficiency,44 which results in ad hoc, subjective determinations of
compliance.
45
These gaps in the Crime Control Act have had the cumulative ef-
fect one might have expected. The civil rights enforcement record
of LEAA since 1973 is still bad.46 Of the few recipients whose activ-
ities have been reviewed by the agency, most were found to be dis-
criminating in some way.47 Yet in no instance has LEAA cut off a
recipient's funds,48 and the lesser sanction of fund deferral has been
used sparingly.49 The agency even continues to fund recipients which
42. As of January, 1975, LEAA had conducted only 18 post-award compliance reviens.
LEAA's explanation is that the process is too lengthy to be practical and that the
agency relies instead on pre-award reviews. However, by the end of fiscal )ear 1974,
LEAA had conducted only about 70 such reviews; it reviews no recipients of block
grants and only those few recipients of discretionary grants receiving .$750,000 or more.
VI COMMISSION REPoRT-1974, at 348, 350, 355.
43. Id. at 365-76.
44. LEAA's present regulations include some guidelines on employment discrimi-
nation, 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.301-.308 (1975), but many of the law enforcement agencies
funded by LEAA (see note 28 supra) discriminate in other ways: (1) in the provision
of police services, see, e.g., UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A1EXIcAN AamERI-
CANS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE SoUrwrST 12-13 (1970); LAW ERS CoM-
MITrEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, supra note 29, at 32; Hearings Before the United
States Commission on Civil Rights, Cairo, Illinois 41 (1972); Council of Orgs. on Phila-
delphia Police Accountability and Responsibility v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Pa.
1973), afrd sub nom. Goode v. Rizzo, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds,
96 S. Ct. 598 (1976); (2) in the treatment of minorities in correctional facilities, see, e.g.
ALABAMA STATE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
ALABAMA PRISONS (1975); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1299 (5th Cir. 1973); (3) in the
selection of judges and juries and in sentencing procedures, see, e.g., VI CoMMISSION
REPORT-1974, at 282; VIRGINIA STATE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE UNITED STATES COsI-
MISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN VIRGINIA: THE ABSENCE OF BLACK JUD(,ES
(1974); D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 949-1006 (1973); Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975) (sex discrimination).
45. VI COMMISSION REPoRT-1974, at 364.
46. Id. at 281-88.
47. Id. at 361 n.968.
48. Id. at 383; Statement of Representative Jordan, supra note 9. at 2.
49. VI COMMISSION RE2oRT-1974, at 377.
Under Title VI, a pending graht application or a grant approved but not yet paid
can be deferred until the agency has had the opportunity to verify compliance. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-5 (1970) (limiting fund deferral in educational programs). Deferral is
recognized in LEAA's own regulations. See 28 C.F.R. § 42.108(b) (1975) (assistance may
be "suspended, terminated, or refused" following noncompliance).
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have refused to comply with judicial orders prohibiting further dis-
crimination. 0 Despite LEAA's stated position that nondiscrimination
is best enforced through judicial proceedings,51 it has referred only
four cases to the Attorney General.a2
There is even some doubt whether victims of a recipient's dis-
crimination can compel the cutoff of funds required by the Crime
Control Act. The Act grants no explicit right of judicial review to
persons seeking to challenge a decision by LEAA to continue fund-
ing recipients which are allegedly discriminatingaa Such review is
available under Title VI, but its scope is limited to the agency's
Title VI responsibilities and does not include the question whether
the agency has observed the provisions of any other law-in the case
of LEAA, the Crime Control Act. And under Title VI, an agency
has broad discretion whether or not to cut off funds; any decision
it makes can generally be set aside by a judge only upon a showing
that this discretion has been abused.54 Thus, the fact that the Crime
Control Act makes such termination mandatory is of no help to a
person seeking review under Title VI.
But judicial review may well be available under the Administra-
50. For example, LEAA continues to fund the Philadelphia Police Department, even
though (1) a federal court had found discrimination in 1972, Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 348
F. Supp. 1084 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir.),
on remand, 5 Emp. Prac. Decs. f 8559 (E.D. Pa. 1973); (2) as of February, 1974, LEAA
had found that the Department was not complying voluntarily, Mailgram from Herbert
C. Rice, LEAA, to Joseph O'Neill, Philadelphia Police Commissioner (Feb. 1, 1974) (on
file with Yale Law Journal); and (3) LEAA itself had referred the matter to the
Attorney General, who instituted a suit. United States v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. No.
74-400 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 19, 1974). Only after the victims of discrimination sued to
compel fund termination, National Black Police Ass'n v. Velde, Civ. No. 95-1444 (D.D.C.,
filed Sept. 4, 1975), did LEAA threaten either deferral or termination. Letter from
Richard W. Velde, Administrator, LEAA, to Hon. Milton J. Shapp, Governor, Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania (undated) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
51. 28 C.F.R. § 42.206(a) (1975); see note 35 supra. At a recent conference with
civil rights leaders, the Administrator of LEAA stated:
I think it is a very accurate observation that we perhaps have excessively relied
on judicial remedies where in fact we could have been more successful in pur-
suing an administrative course too.
LEAA Policy Development Seminar on Civil Rights Compliance, at 217, Rochester,
Mich. (Feb. 10-11, 1975) (Richard W. Velde, Administrator, LEAA) (on file with Yale
Law Journal).
52. LEAA refuses to disclose the names of two of the recipients referred to the
Attorney General. VI COMMISSION REPoRT-1974, at 384. The others are a matter of public
record: United States v. City of Chicago, 395 F. Supp. 329 (N.D. II. 1975) (Chicago
Police Dep't); United States v. Philadelphia, Civ. No. 74-400 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 19,
1974) (Philadelphia Police Dep't).
53. Section 2 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3759(a) (Supp. IV 1974), which reenacted an
identical provision in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, pro-
vides judicial review for "any applicant or grantee" dissatisfied with final agency action.
No other possible plaintiffs are mentioned in the Act.
54. See p. 726 and note 24 supra.
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tive Procedure Act (APA) to an individual seeking to enforce the
Crime Control Act's stricter requirements. The APA provides ju-
dicial review to any person "aggrieved" by any act, or failure to act,
by a federal agency.55 If an aggrieved person demonstrates sufficient
cause, the court must compel the agency to take any action "unlaw-
fully withheld or unreasonably delayed." 56 It is settled that if a statute
requires that action be taken against a recipient of federal aid en-
gaged in discrimination, and an agency fails to act, then any victim
of this discrimination is "aggrieved." 57 There is no reason not to
apply this principle to the Crime Control Act.
Under the APA itself, however, judicial review is not available if
another statute precludes it.5s This provision raises some doubt as
to whether the APA can be invoked by individuals suffering discrimi-
nation at the hands of LEAA recipients. Judicial review of LEAA
action under the Crime Control Act is gTanted to "any applicant or
grantee," but there is no mention of review for any other person.rl
It may be argued that by thus providing review to some plaintiffs,
the Act by implication precludes review under the APA for those
not mentioned.60 The weight of authority lies against this manner
of construction. 1 Nonetheless, it is less than certain under present
55. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 702 (1970).
56. Id. § 706(1).
57. See Tomlinson & Mashaw, supra note 17, at 630 n.84 (citing cases). Individuals
with Title VI claims are clearly entitled to APA review. See p. 724 and note 16 supra.
58. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1970).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 3759(a) (Supp. IV 1974).
60. As originally proposed, the APA exception for statutes precluding review, 5 U.S.C.
§ 701(a)(1) (1970), was limited to explicit preclusions. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. 155, 160 (1946) (text of bill). It was changed at the request of the Attorney General
to the present form in order to allow preclusions by implication. Id. at 229-30. Implied
preclusion of review was the basis of the Court's decision in Switchmen's Union v.
National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943), decided before the enactment of the APA.
The Court denied review of the defendant's certification of an election on the grounds
that the Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) and ch. 691, 48 Stat. 1185 (1934)
(now codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-164 (1970)), did not include such certification within
the class of specifically reviewable acts. 320 U.S. at 305-06. In Kirkland v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 167 F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1948), the reasoning of Switchmen's Union was
followed in construing the provision of the APA that review is not available where
precluded by another statute. 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964) (now 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970)). Other
cases involving implied preclusion include American Fed'n of Labor v. NLRB, 308
U.S. 401, 404, 411 (1940) (NLRB certification decision); Guardian Life Ins. Co. v.
Bohlinger, 308 N.Y. 174, 181, 124 N.E. 2d 110, 113 (1954) (claim under state insurance
law). Switchmen's Union has been criticized and distinguished in several recent cases.
International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. North Carolina Ports Auth., 463 F.2d 1, 3 (4th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Feaster, 410 F.2d 1354, 1361 (5th Cir. 1969).
61. The Supreme Court has stated that the judicial review provisions of the APA
should be construed broadly. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970) (dicta); Brownell
v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180, 185 (1956) ("[U]nless made by clear language of super-
sedure, the expanded mode of review granted by [the APA] cannot be modified.") See
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADNIINIsTRATIvE AcriON 373 (1965); note 60 supra.
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law that aggrieved individuals can enforce the cutoff of funds in the
courts. 6 2
II. An Alternative Plan of Enforcement for LEAA
LEAA's lax enforcement has undermined the congressional pro-
hibition of racial discrimination by the agency's recipients. Congress
should replace the loose provisions of Title VI and the Crime Control
Act with an enforcement scheme which closely circumscribes LEAA's
permissible range of action and which guarantees that individual
victims of discrimination can compel the agency to take such action
as the law requires.
A. Specification
Although broad administrative discretion63 often serves government
agencies well, it is not necessary to effective enforcement of nondis-
crimination, and may even hamper enforcement when nondiscrimina-
tion is peripheral to an agency's central purpose. If an agency is to
deal with problems in a constantly changing environment, a detailed
statutory scheme prescribing what it must do would quickly become
62. Only one case has discussed the right of an aggrieved individual to seek review
of LEAA's civil rights obligations under the Crime Control Act. In Hardy v. Leonard,
377 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1974), a black woman who had been denied employment
by the Oakland Police Department sued LEAA under both Title VI and the Crime
Control Act, charging that the agency had taken inadequate steps to assure nondis-
crimination by the police department. For purposes of deciding whether the plaintiff
could obtain judicial review, the court distinguished between the provisions of Title
VI and the Crime Control Act. It noted that 42 U.S.C. § 3759(a) (Supp. IV 1974) provided
review of agency action taken under the Crime Control Act only for LEAA grantees
and applicants, but that Title VI authorized such review " 'as may otherwise be pro-
vided by law.'" Id. at 835, n.2, citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1970). The court found that
the APA provided review of the agency action taken under Title VI; however, it made
no mention of whether the APA provided review of agency action taken under the
Crime Control Act. By failing to address the latter question, the opinion may be in-
terpreted to suggest that such review is precluded by Congress's failure to include in-
dividuals injured by recipients of LEAA funds among those permitted to obtain review
under 42 U.S.C. § 3759(a) (Supp. IV 1974). But see Ely v. Velde, 321 F. Supp. 1088,
1092 (E.D. Va.), afj'd in part, rev'd in part, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971) (granting
APA review of LEAA action to individual plaintiffs and rejecting the argument that the
grant of review for LEAA applicants and grantees under 42 U.S.C. § 3759(a) precludes
review for other persons under APA). Nevertheless, Hardy represents a troublesome un-
certainty as to whether review will be granted in the future.
Even if a plaintiff could not obtain review under the APA of an LEAA decision
not to terminate funds, he might succeed in bringing a mandamus action under 28
U.S.C. § 1361 (Supp. IV 1974). However, § 1361 reaches only the "ministerial" duties
of an official, Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844, 849 (3d Cir. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 410 U.S. 995 (1974), and LEAA's obligations under the Crime Control Act
are largely discretionary.
63. For a recent discussion of the problem of discretion in administrative law, see
Stewart, The Reformation of Administrathe Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975).
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obsolete. 64 Broad discretion is also essential when the agency's task
is so specialized and complex that reasonable choices can only be made
by those with a high degree of expertise., And at the outset of a
new program, experimentation is often necessary before proper stan-
dards and procedures can be formulated. 0 But discrimination is not
a phenomenon whose contours change rapidly over time. Expertise is
probably not required to detect or respond to instances of discrimi-
nation: Congress must have so concluded when it chose to assign the
responsibility of enforcing Title VI to 25 different agencies," none
primarily concerned with civil rights. Whatever the apparent virtues
of experimentation were at the time Title VI was enacted, 12 years
later they are belied by LEAA's record of failure.
The enforcement of nondiscrimination is not LEAA's main func-
tion. Effective enforcement requires that the agency attach impor-
tance to factors entirely foreign to those which normally determine
the merits of funding requests. As a result, the agency is likely to be
predisposed against vigorous enforcement and inclined to do no more
than the bare minimum in this area. And since LEAA's raison d'dtre
is to foster law enforcement programs, its administrators will hardly
be quick to impose a paralyzing fund cutoff, even in the face of dis-
crimination that they might otherwise deplore. s In addition, since
64. Id. at 1695 (wage and price regulation). See, e.g., Wright, Book Review, 81 YALE
L.J. 585, 587 (1972) ("[I]t is hard to imagine how Congress could go beyond the vaguest
sort of standards to control ratemaking by the Interstate Commerce Commission.")
65. K. DAVIS, supra note 21, at 39-41 (sampling the innumerable specific decisions
left to the Civil Aeronautics Board); Stewart, supra note 63, at 1678; Comment, Abuse
of Discretion, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 40, 41 (1966).
66. Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal Discretionary Adjudication and Enforcement,
72 CoLum. L. REv. 1293, 1296 (1972); Stewart, supra note 63, at 1695.
In addition, Congress may choose to delegate discretion to an agency because it lacks
the political consensus to legislate beyond the outline of a general goal. K. DAvis, supra
note 21, at 39, 46; Stewart, supra at 1672 n.10, 1695, 1697.
67. See note 1 supra.
68. See Tomlinson & Mashaw, supra note 17, at 619-20. LEAA's civil rights director
has argued that fund termination would "only serve to hurt those programs that LEAA
funding was designed to help." VI CoMmiSSIoN REPoRT-1974, at 384. See TWENTIFTri
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON THE LAw ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, LAW
ENFORCEMENT: THE FEDERAL ROLF 20-21 (1976).
The problems attending agency enforcement of peripheral mandates is not limited to
civil rights. Similar difficulties have arisen under the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4347 (1976 Supp.) (NEPA), which requires all federal
agencies to consider the environmental impact of every proposal over which the agency
presides. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). Congress recognized that protection of the environment
is necessarily a secondary concern to agencies with other primary functions, and NEPA
was enacted to insure that this secondary status would not cause environmental con-
siderations to be ignored entirely. 115 CoNG. REc. 40423 (1969) (Sen. Muskie); F. ANDER-
SON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 1, 106 (1973); Leventhal, Environmental Decisionilaking and
the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 515 (1974). Nevertheless, the ill-defined
NEPA directive has failed to compel agency decisionmakers to give sufficient weight
to environmental factors. See F. ANDERSON, supra at 257-58. See also NAACP v. FPC,
520 F.2d 432, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd, 44 U.S.L.W. 4659 (U.S. May 19, 1976) (FPC
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LEAA's task requires continuous dealings with its recipients, the
agency will probably be unwilling to dissipate accumulated goodwill
in controversies regarded as peripheral by both parties.69 Finally, re-
cipients are far more likely to contest LEAA's decisions than are those
suffering discrimination, and the agency therefore has more to fear
from angry recipients than from the victims of their discrimination."
A precise specification of procedures to be followed by LEAA would
strengthen its enforcement program in several ways. First, it would
counteract the predisposition of its personnel against strict enforce-
ment by closing off the possibilities of inaction latent within the ex-
isting laws. Second, it would make LEAA's performance more sus-
ceptible to evaluation by its overseers.7 1 Third, greater specification
would allow courts to impose a stricter standard of review; plaintiffs
would not need to demonstrate that the agency's action was "arbi-
trary or capricious," but simply that it was "not in accordance with
law." 72 Fourth, it would diminish the influence of informal political
pressures on enforcement decisions-pressures which are magnified
by the fact that LEAA is not an independent agency, but rather part
of the executive branch.
73
not required to issue rules prohibiting discrimination under its responsibility to regulate
in the public interest).
69. See Stewart, supra note 63, at 1714.
70. See id. at 1684-86, 1713-15.
71. See Wright, supra note 64, at 581. At the present time, ten governmental au-
thorities are involved in overseeing LEAA: six congressional subcommittees, see note 26
supra; the Federal Programs Section of the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division,
see note 84 infra; the Office of Management and Budget, 31 U.S.C. §§ 16, 153 (Supp.
IV 1974); the Comptroller General, 31 U.S.C. §§ 42, 1154 (Supp. IV 1974); and the
United States Commission on Civil Rights, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1975-1975e (Supp. IV 1974).
Of these, only the Civil Rights Commission devotes a significant amount of attention
to LEAA's civil rights program. The Federal Programs Section of the Civil Rights Di-
vision has failed to fulfill adequately its responsibility to prescribe standards and pro-
cedures for Title VI enforcement. VI COMMISSION REPoRT-1974, at 798-803.
72. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). See Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1, 6 (2d Cir.
1966) ("[O]nce appropriate rules have been established, the discretion conferred in day
to day administration cannot have been assumed to extend to unreasonable deviation
from such rules on an ad hoc basis at the whim of the Administration."); Saferstein,
Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion", 82 HARV.
L. REv. 367, 376, 380-81 (1968); Comment, supra note 65, at 41-42; Wright, supra note
64, at 581. Cf. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding reviewable discretionary action by agency, but remanding for
agency articulation of the factors it considered).
There is also evidence that greater specification decreases the frequency with which
judicial review is sought. H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 24 (1962);
see Sofaer, supra note 66, at 1302 (study of Immigration and Naturalization Service).
In addition, specification might sufficiently restrict agency discretion to make it "minis-
terial," and thus possibly subject to a mandamus action under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (Supp.
IV 1974). See note 62 supra.
73. See J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 61-63 (1938); R. NOLL, REFORMING
REGULATION 5 (1971); Sofaer, supra note 66, at 1301-02 (Immigration and Naturalization
Service); Stewart, supra note 63, at 1676; notes 17 supra (frustration of civil rights en-
forcement by executive branch) and 87 infra (informal congressional pressures).
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There is a limit, however, beyond which statutory specification may
hinder an effective civil rights progTam. As the original proponents
of Title VI noted, 74 a degree of flexibility is needed to allow a re-
sponse suited to the particular circumstances of each instance of dis-
crimination. Rather than eliminate discretion altogether, therefore,
specification should establish minimum standards to which LEAA
must adhere.
Two means exist for specifying LEAA's responsibilities. Congress
may itself enact a detailed statutory scheme, or it may place the bur-
den on LEAA by conditioning appropriations on the promulgation of
acceptable regulations.75 The delegation of rulemaking power to the
agency would be justified only if it were likely that the agency were
better able to address the problem of discrimination than Congress.
However, nothing in LEAA's performance to date indicates that it
is either vigorous or expert in the enforcement of civil rights. And
even if promulgated, the regulations could be changed unilaterally by
the agency.76 Hence direct statutory specification seems the only way
for Congress to give effect to its own mandate.
In light of the present deficiencies in LEAA's enforcement scheme,
Congress should establish deadlines for responses to complaints,77 and
specify the minimum pace at which the agency must proceed from
each stage of the enforcement process to the next.78 LEAA should
be required to report its grounds for denying any complainant's
request that an authorized sanction be imposed; such a report would
permit informed judicial review and would establish precedents to
74. See note 15 supra.
75. To avoid constitutional problems, Congress as a whole would have to approve
these regulations and submit them to the President for his approval. See note 91 infra.
76. Stewart, supra note 63, at 1701 n.155. Such changes would be especially casy
if LEAA is correct in its view that it is exempt from the rulemaking procedures of
the APA under 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1970). 40 Fed. Reg. 56454 (1975).
77. Under 28 C.F.R. § 42.107(c) (1975), LEAA is required to act "promptly," but
the agency presently imposes needless delays in processing complaints. VI Co,'tMIssIN
RPoRT-1974, at 369-76. The proposed regulations, § 42.404, 40 Fed. Reg. 56455 (1975),
would require that complaints generally be investigated within 180 da)s, but would
provide exceptions which may frustrate the requirement. For example, LEAA would
be exempted from any duty to investigate, once the complaint is referred to a State
Planning Agency, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or any of a number
of other authorities, none of which is subject to the 180-day requirement.
78. The only time limit provided in the Crime Control Act requires that LEAA
give the governor of a state "a reasonable time" to achieve compliance before com-
mencing procedures for termination of funds to a recipient within that state. 42 U.S.C.
§ 3766(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1974). LEAA's proposed regulations, 40 Fed. Reg. 56454 (1975), are
inadequate because they do not establish time limits for all steps of the compliance pro-
cess. For example, no limit is placed on the time allotted for the actual investigation.
Moreover, LEAA may circumvent other time limits by delegating investigation to another
authority. See note 77 sura.
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promote consistency among enforcement decisions.79 Congress should
establish standards by which compliance is to be measured. A showing
of recipients' nonadherence to these standards would establish a prima
facie case of discrimination, 0 and, after an opportunity for voluntary
compliance, would automatically trigger a deferral of funding,Si Auto-
matic deferral would encourage recipients to come forward with evi-
dence to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination. The standards
would establish both a measure for supervision of the agency's en-
forcement effort and a guide for recipients in their own efforts to
eliminate discrimination. In addition, LEAA should be required to
review the compliance of its recipients as a matter of course without
waiting for complaints.
82
79. K. DAvis, supra note 21, at 103-11. Courts have recognized the need for agencies
to provide reasons for their actions. E.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA,
465 F.2d 528, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d
608, 612 (2d Cir. 1965). The present requirement, unchanged in the proposed regula-
tions, is that written notice of the decision, but not its factual basis, must be given.
28 C.F.R. §§ 42.107(d)(2), 42.108(c)(1) (1975).
An alternative proposal might be to grant disappointed LEAA complainants a hearing,
a right now accorded to LEAA recipients before a decision to terminate funds. 28 C.F.R.
§ 42.104 (1975). Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 101.6 (1975) (hearing granted to complainant following
NLRB dismissal of charges).
80. The evidentiary basis for LEAA compliance actions would be similar to the
"pattern or practice" criterion under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-6 (Supp. IV 1974). LEAA's proposed regulations adopt the EEOC's employment
discrimination guidelines, 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.201-.308 (1975), but do not provide standards
for other discriminatory .practices of LEAA recipients. See note 44 supra. For one at-
tempt to develop such standards for police services, see P. BLOCH, EQUALITY OF DisrRI-
BUTION OF POLICE SERvxcs-A CAsE SruvY OF WASHINGTON, D.C. (Urban Institute 1974).
Although § 518(b) of the Crime Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3766(b) (Supp. IV 1974),
prohibits LEAA from imposing quotas to achieve racial balance among employees of
its recipients, both LEAA and the Justice Department have explicitly recognized that
a rebuttable presumption based on numerical compliance standards is consistent with
§ 518(b). Legal Opinion No. 74-54---"Goals and Timetables" Relationship to Section
518(b)-January 21, 1974 (memorandum from LEAA General Counsel to LEAA Deputy
Administrator for Administration); LEAA Instruction: Goals and Timetables Under Sec-
tion 518(b) of the Crime Control Act of 1973, Instruction No. I 7300.1 (undated) (in-
struction from LEAA Deputy Administrator for Administration to LEAA regional offices
and State Planning Agencies) (both on file with Yale Law Journal).
81. Cf. Revenue Sharing Hearings, supra note 23, at 152, 165 (similar proposal con-
cerning Revenue Sharing). Under LEAA's present and proposed regulations the agency
is required to provide a hearing before suspending funds. 28 C.F.R. § 42.108(c) (1975);
Proposed Reg. § 42.410, 40 Fed., Reg. 56457 (1975). Under the procedures suggested here,
the hearing would occur after deferral.
82. LEAA's present and proposed regulations provide for reviews "from time to time."
28 C.F.R. § 42.107(a) (1975); Proposed Reg. § 42.405(a), 40 Fed. Reg. 56455 (1975). This
vague wording has meant that very few recipients have ever been reviewed, see note
42 supra, and as a result recipients do not take the threat of review seriously. As
Catherine Higgs Milton, former Director of the Police Foundation, stated:
Generally, the departments which are . . . trying hard to make improvements . . .
say that LEAA does not know what they are doing. . . . One person told me
that . . . he did not think that LEAA would even know that they had not filed
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B. Control
A specific statutory plan which no longer accommodates LEAA's
inaction would do much to strengthen the agency's civil rights en-
forcement. But it will not suffice by itself: a guarantee that the
specified standards and procedures will be followed is also needed.
Since the agency is likely to be predisposed against strict enforce-
ment,sa some effective external control must be provided.
The potential for this control resides in all three branches of the
federal government. Executive control over LEAA operates through
the Attorney General's authority to coordinate the civil rights pro-
grams of all federal agencies.s4 This authority has not been used ef-
fectively in the past,sa and it would be unwise to rely on executive
leadership in the future. Congressional control over the agency is
presently exercised through the oversight of subcommittees.8 0  The
pressures generated by this supervision are not likely to promote non-
discrimination, since the informal control exercised by committee
members is entirely unstructured and often shaped by personal, local,
and political motivations.8 7 These problems would only be exacer-
bated if Congress undertook more active supervisions" of LEAA's
[an Equal Employment Opportunity Plan] or even cared about whether they
filed it....
From the departments which are avoiding making changes, I got the impres-
sion that their view is that, again, LEAA is not even going to find out or, if they
do, there will be ways to avoid making changes.
Transcript of LEAA Policy Development Seminar on Civil Rights Compliance 61-62,
Rochester, Mich. (Feb. 10-11, 1975) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
Representative Rangel's 1972 proposal, supra note 40, would have required pre-award
reviews, 118 CoNo. Rc. 11390 (1972), as does the Office of Federal Contract Compliance.
41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.1, 60-1.2, 60-1.3 (1975). LEAA's regulations require recipients to de-
velop Equal Employment Opportunity Plans, which are rarely used by the agency.
28 C.F.R. §§ 42.302, 42.304 (1975); VI COMMissIoN REoRT-1974, at 306. If supplemented
with information on practices other than employment, these plans would be sufficient
in most cases to make annual pre-award compliance determinations.
83. See pp. 734-35 supra.
84. Exec. Order No. 11764, 3 C.F.R. app. 124-25 (1974 Comp.). Title VI imposed
a check upon agency discretion by requiring all regulations to be approved by the
President. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1970); 110 CONG. RLc. 2497-500 (Rep. Lindsay), 12716
(1964) (Sen. Humphrey). The President delegated this power to the Attorney General,
whom the Executive Order directs to "prescribe standards and procedures regarding
implementation of Title Vl." The Attorney General, in turn, has delegated this respon-
sibility to the Federal Programs Section of the Civil Rights Division. VI COMNISSION
REPoRT-1974, at 645.
85. VI Co~imrssIoN RExP'oRT-1974, at 798-803; see note 17 supra.
86. For enumeration of the relevant congressional committees, see note 26 supra.
87. J. HARRIS, supra note 27, at 214; MacMahon, Congressional Oversight of Ad-
ministration: The Power of the Purse-Il, 58 PoL. Sci. Q. 380 (1943).
88. For example, a statute might require LEAA to provide a congressional committee
with a civil rights compliance report before any grant could be approved, or to submit
to the committee an explanation of any decision not to terminate funds following a
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day-to-day workings.8 0 Increased committee control could not help
but further politicize the issue of civil rights, a problem Title VI
was designed to avoid.00 It would also hamper judicial review by the
resulting diffusion of responsibility: confusion as to which body is
responsible for decisions would decrease LEAA's accountability. More-
over, express administrative control such as a committee veto over
agency action might well violate Article II of the Constitution by
vesting an essentially executive function in Congress; even if such
ongoing supervision could somehow be characterized as "legislation,"
it would nevertheless violate Article I by allowing a part of Congress
to act as a whole and by depriving the President of the power to
approve congressional enactments before they become law.91
Judicial review is in all likelihood the best means of ensuring that
LEAA adheres to its statutory obligations, once these have been ade-
quately specified. The courts' traditional function as an independent
check on administrative abuse is even more essential when the vin-
dication sought is not that of competing private interests, but of a
minority's statutory right. As a nonmajoritarian branch, the judiciary
is more apt to be immune from political pressures and to hold LEAA
to a standard strictly defined by law.9 2 In light of the affirmative
complaint. Cf. Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act of 1954, 16 U.S.C. § 1002
(1970) (requiring committee approval for certain conservation projects over $250,000);
J. HARRIS, supra note 27, at 136-37 (discussing relationship between the Atomic Energy
Commission and the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2252 (1970)).
The recently created Senate Select Committee on Intelligence greatly expands the
congressional power to oversee the CIA and other government intelligence units. The
committee will receive information on intelligence activities, and, although it has no
formal veto power, it can vote to make public any activity of which it disapproves. If
the President objects to disclosure, the decision is left to the full Senate. S. Res. 400,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 4, 5, 8 (1976), reprinted in 122 CONG. RFc. S7563-65 (daily ed.
May 19, 1976).
89. See Stewart, supra note 63, at 1695 n.128.
90. See note 6 supra.
91. See Comment, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the
Executive, 63 CAL. L. REv. 983, 1053-60 (1975); Ginnane, The Control of Federal Ad-
ministration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees, 66 HARv. L. Rav. 569, 571,
605-09 (1953). The Constitution vests the executive power of the United States in the
President and the legislative power in the Congress as a whole. U.S. CONsr. art. II,
§ 1; id. art. I, § 1. It also requires Congress to submit its actions to the President for
his approval (or veto) before they become law. Id. art. I, § 7.
Title VI contains a "report and wait" provision of the type criticized in Comment,
supra at 1060-63:
In the case of any action terminating assistance the agency, shall file with the
committees of the House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction a full written
report of the circumstances and the grounds for such action. No such action shall
become effective until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of such report.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970). It appears that Congress has never attempted to override
an agency fund termination reported under this provision.
92. See, e.g., Fiss, The Jurisprudence of Busing, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 194,
209-10 (1975); Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme
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virtues of judicial review and the practical and constitutional infir-
mities of the other means of control considered here, there is no
reason for Congress to consider seriously other means.
Congress should make clear that judicial review is available for
any individual aggrieved by LEAA's failure to respond to the dis-
criminatory practices of a recipient of federal financial assistance.
It would be unwise to rely on the courts to find that such a right
is not impliedly precluded by the existing provisions for review in
the Crime Control Act.93 Clear statutory recognition of the right of
review, together with increased specification of LEAA's obligations,
will give fuller effect to Congress's mandate against discrimination.
Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769, 787-89 (1971). But see A. BICKEL, TIE SUPREME COURT
AND THE IDEA OF PROCRESS 37 (1970) (arguing that the political process will ultimately
protect minority rights).
93. See pp. 731-33 supra.
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